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1. Introduction
Kripkemodelswere introduced as ameans of giving semantics tomodal logics and theywere later used to give semantics
for intuitionistic logic as well; see [22,23]. The purpose of the present paper is to show that Kripke models can also be used
as semantics for classical logic. Of course, Kripke semantics can be indirectly assigned to classical logic by means of some
appropriate double-negation translation, as in [3], but our goal here is to provide a direct presentation of a notion of Kripke
semantics for classical logic.
We will use the LKµµ˜ sequent calculus of [8] to represent proofs, but the conclusions given apply to any complete formal
system for classical logic. There are at least two reasons for choosing LKµµ˜: first, it is a typing system for a calculus very
close to λ-calculus and we are ultimately interested in the computational content of classical logic; second, the symmetry
of left/right distinguished formulae of LKµµ˜ allows us to give two dual notions of models, of which only one needs to be, and
is, presented in this paper, while the other can be derived by analogy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of the classical Kripke model, based on two
modifications to the traditional notion, and discusses the relationship between the traditional notion and our notion.
Section 3 introduces the sequent calculus LKµµ˜ and gives a soundness theorem for it. Section 4 proves a completeness
theorem for a universal model constructed from the deduction system itself. Section 5 is the concluding section, which
discusses related and future work.
We use the standard inductive definition of predicate logic formulae for the connectives {>,⊥,∧,∨,→, ∃,∀}. The
language has infinitely many constants. A sentence is a formula where all variables are bound by quantifiers. An atomic
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: danko.ilik@polytechnique.edu (D. Ilik), gslee@ropas.snu.ac.kr (G. Lee), hugo.herbelin@inria.fr (H. Herbelin).
0168-0072/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.apal.2010.04.007
1368 D. Ilik et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2010) 1367–1378
formula is one which is not built up from logical connectives, i.e., it is one built up of a predicate symbol. The shorthand¬A
stands for A→⊥.
All statements and proofs are constructive.
2. Classical Kripke models
Kripke models can be considered as the ‘‘most classical’’ of all the semantics for intuitionistic logic, for two reasons: first,
each of the ‘possible worlds’ that define a Kripkemodel is a classical world in itself (where either an atom or its negation are
true); second, it is the single of the semantics for intuitionistic logic which has only a classical proof of completeness, when
disjunction and existential quantification are considered.1
In the last two decades, the Curry–Howard correspondence between intuitionistic proof systems and typed lambda-
calculi has been extended to classical proof systems [17,29,8]. The idea for introducingdirect-style Kripkemodels for classical
logic came from their usefulness in providing normalization-by-evaluation for intuitionistic proof systems [6,7]. To account
for a classical proof system we modify the traditional notion of the Kripke model in the following two ways.
Not taking the forcing relation as primitive. We take as primitive the notion of ‘‘strong refutation’’, and define forcing in
terms of it.2 The forcing definition we get in this way partly coincides with the traditional definition of forcing, as explained
in Section 2.1.
Allowing certain nodes to validate absurdity. We allow certain possible worlds to be marked as ‘‘fallible’’, or ‘‘exploding’’.
This approach has been taken for Kripke models in [35] and for Beth models by Friedman [31], and is necessary in order to
have a constructive proof of completeness, in the view of the meta-mathematical results from [21,26,27], which preclude
constructive proofs3 of completeness in case one wants to retain that absurdity must never be valid in a possible world.4
Definition 1. A classical Kripke model is given by a quintuple (K ,≤,D,s,⊥), K inhabited, such that
• (K ,≤) is a poset of ‘‘possible worlds’’;
• D is the ‘‘domain function’’ assigning sets to the elements of K such that
∀w,w′ ∈ K , (w ≤ w′ ⇒ D(w) ⊆ D(w′)),
i.e., D is monotone;
• (−) : (−) s is a binary relation of ‘‘strong refutation’’ between worlds and atomic sentences in the language extended
with constant symbols for each element ofD := ∪{D(w) : w ∈ K} such that
– w : X(d1, . . . , dn) s ⇒ di ∈ D(w) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
– (Monotonicity)w : X(d1, . . . , dn) s & w ≤ w′ ⇒ w′ : X(d1, . . . , dn) s;
• (−) ⊥ is a unary relation on worlds labelling a world as ‘‘exploding’’, which is also monotone:
w ⊥ &w ≤ w′ ⇒ w′ ⊥ .
The strong refutation relation is extended from atomic to composite sentences inductively and by mutually defining the
relations of forcing and (non-strong) refutation.
Definition 2. The relation (−) : (−) s of strong refutation is extended to the relation between worlds w and composite
sentences A in the extended language with constants in D(w), inductively, together with the two new relations:
• A sentence A is forced in the worldw (notationw : A) if any worldw′ ≥ w, which strongly refutes A, is exploding;
• A sentence A is refuted in the worldw (notationw : A ) if any worldw′ ≥ w, which forces A, is exploding;
• w : A ∧ B s ifw : A  orw : B ;
• w : A ∨ B s ifw : A  andw : B ;
• w : A→ B s ifw : A andw : B ;
• w : ∀x.A(x) s ifw : A(d)  for some d ∈ D(w);
• w : ∃x.A(x) s if, for anyw′ ≥ w and d ∈ D(w′),w′ : A(d) ;
• ⊥ is always strongly refuted;
• > is never strongly refuted.
1 There is an intuitionistic proof in [35], but it makes use of the fan theorem which is not universally recognized as constructive.
2 For an alternative, see the discussion on dual models in Section 5.
3 Strictly speaking, the cited results show that having a constructive proof of completeness implies having a proof of Markov’s Principle.
4 Extending the class of Boolean models with inconsistent models is also the key to the constructive proof of the classical completeness theorem in [24].
For an analysis of that result, see [4].
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The notions of forcing and refutation can be somewhat understood as the classical notions of being true and being false.
However, a statement of the form P ⇒ w ⊥ should not be thought of as a negation of P at the meta-level, because in the
concrete model we provide in Section 4 w ⊥ is always an inhabited set. In other words, we never use ex falso quodlibet at
the meta-level to handle exploding nodes.
The notion of strong refutation is more informative than the notion of (non-strong) refutation, not only because the
former implies the latter, but also because, for example, having w : A ∧ B s tells us which one of A, B is refuted, while
w : A ∧ B  does not.
A more detailed characterization of the notions is given in the rest of this section.
Lemma 3. Strong refutation, forcing and refutation are monotone in any classical Kripke model.
Proof. The monotonicity of strong refutation can be proved by induction on the formula in question, while that of forcing
and refutation is obviously true. 
Lemma 4. Strong refutation implies refutation. In any worldw and for any sentence A,w : A s impliesw : A .
Proof. Suppose w : A s, w′ ≥ w and w′ : A. Then w′ is exploding because w′ : A s by monotonicity. Since w′ was arbitr-
ary,w : A . 
2.1. Relation to traditional forcing and further properties
It is natural to askwhat is the relationship between traditional intuitionistic forcing [31] and our forcing,whose definition
relies on a more primitive notion. Lemmas 5 and 8 give that the two notions (superficially) coincide on the fragment of
formulae constructed by {→,∧,∀,>}.
Lemma 5. The following statements hold.
w : A→ B ⇐⇒ for allw′ ≥ w,w′ : A⇒ w′ : B. (1)
w : A ∧ B ⇐⇒ w : A andw : B. (2)
w : ∀x.A(x) ⇐⇒ for allw′ ≥ w and d ∈ D(w′), w′ : A(d). (3)
w : A ∨ B ⇐= w : A orw : B. (4)
w : ∃x.A(x) ⇐= for some d ∈ D(w),w : A(d). (5)
Proof. Lemmas 3 and 4 are used implicitly in the following proof.
(1) Left-to-right: Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A. To show that w′ : B, we let w′′ ≥ w′ and w′′ : B s and have to show that
w′′ is exploding. Since thenw′′ : A→ B s holds by monotonicity and Lemma 4, the claim follows from the definition of
w : A→ B.
Right-to-left: Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A→ B s, i.e., w′ : A and w′ : B . We have to show that w′ is exploding. But,
this is immediate, sincew′ : B by assumption.
(2) Left-to-right: Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A s. Then w′ : A , and so w′ : A ∧ B s. This implies that w′ is exploding; that
is,w : A. Similarly, we can show thatw : B.
Right-to-left: Supposew′ ≥ w andw′ : A∧ B s. Therefore we havew′ : A  orw′ : B . Each case leads tow′ :⊥ since
w′ : A andw′ : B by monotonicity.
(3) Left-to-right: Supposew′′ ≥ w′ ≥ w, d ∈ D(w′), andw′′ : A(d) s. Thenw′′ : ∀x.A(x) s, sow′′ is exploding.
Right-to-left: Supposew′ ≥ w andw′ : ∀x.A(x) s, i.e.,w′ : A(d)  for some d ∈ D(w′). Sow′ is exploding by assumption.
The rest of the cases are obvious. 
Note, however, that although the definitions of our and intuitionistic forcing ‘‘match’’ on the fragment {→,∧,∀,>}, that
does not mean that a formula in that fragment is forced in our sense if and only if it is forced in the intuitionistic sense. The
law of Peirce ((A→ B)→ A)→ A is one counterexample to that: it is classically but not intuitionistically forced; this is so
because, in our forcing, hidden under the surface, there is a notion of refutation which can be used.
Remark 6. The following do not hold in general, even if reasoning classically.
• w : A ∨ B =⇒ w : A orw : B.
• w : ∃x.A(x) =⇒ for some t ∈ D(w),w : A(t).
The explanation is deferred to Remark 20.
Lemma 7. Given a classical Kripke modelK , the following hold.
1. w : A→ B  iffw : A→ B s.
2. w : A ∨ B  iff w : A ∨ B s.
3. w : ∃x.A(x)  iff w : ∃x.A(x) s.
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4. Ifw : A  orw : B , thenw : A ∧ B .
5. Ifw : A(d)  for some d ∈ D(w), thenw : ∀x.A(x) .
Proof. 1. Right-to-left is Lemma 4.
Left-to-right: Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A s. In order to show that w′ is exploding it suffices to show that w′ : A→ B.
For this assumew′′ ≥ w′ andw′′ : A→ B s, i.e.,w′′ : A andw′′ : B . Thenw′′ is exploding since we havew′′ : A s by
monotonicity. Similarly, we can show thatw : B .
2. Right-to-left is Lemma 4.
Left-to-right: Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A. Then by Lemma 5, w′ : A ∨ B holds. So w′ is exploding. That is, w : A .
Similarly,w : B  holds.
3. Right-to-left is Lemma 4.
Left-to-right: Suppose w′′ ≥ w′ ≥ w, d ∈ D(w′) and w′′ : A(d). Then, by Lemma 5, w′′ : ∃x.A(x). So w′′ is exploding
since we havew′′ : ∃x.A(x)  by monotonicity.
4. Suppose w.l.o.g. w : A , w′ ≥ w and w′ : A ∧ B. Then by Lemma 5, w′ : A. So w′ is exploding because we have
w′ : A  by monotonicity.
5. Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : ∀x.A(x). Then, by Lemma 5, w′ : A(d). So w′ is exploding because we have w′ : A(d)  by
monotonicity. 
We can also say that forcing of⊥ and> behaves as expected with respect to exploding nodes [35,24]:
Lemma 8. 1. w : > andw : ⊥ .
2. w is exploding iffw : ⊥.
3. w is exploding iffw : > .
Proof. 1. Obvious.
2. Letw be an arbitrary world.
w : ⊥ ⇐⇒ ∀(w′ ≥ w) (w′ : ⊥ s ⇒ w′ :⊥)
⇐⇒ ∀(w′ ≥ w) (w′ :⊥) ⇐⇒ w :⊥ .
3. Similar. 
We can use the previous lemmas to show that the forcing relation for classical logic indeed behaves ‘‘classically’’.
Lemma 9. The following hold in the classical Kripke semantics.
1. w : A ⇐⇒ w : ¬A s.
2. w : A ⇐⇒ w : ¬A.
3. w : ¬A ⇐⇒ w : A.
4. w : ¬A ⇐⇒ w : ¬A s.
5. w : A ⇐⇒ w : ¬¬A.
6. w : A ⇐⇒ w : ¬¬A .
7. w : ¬A s ⇐⇒ w : ¬¬A ⇐⇒ w : A.
Proof. 1. Obvious by definition becausew : ⊥ .
2. It follows from Lemma 5.
3. Obvious by Lemma 7 and the previous claims.
4.–7. Obvious from the previous claims. 
Corollary 10. In any classical Kripke model, the following holds.
w : ¬A s ⇐⇒ w : ¬¬A ⇐⇒ w : A.
We now consider the following double-negation translation (·)∗, which is the one of Gödel-Gentzen [16,15], except that
atomic formulae,⊥ and> are not doubly negated:
X∗ := X (X is atomic,⊥ or>)
(A ∧ B)∗ := A∗ ∧ B∗
(A→ B)∗ := A∗ → B∗
(∀x.A)∗ := ∀x.A∗
(A ∨ B)∗ := ¬(¬A∗ ∧ ¬B∗)
(∃x.A)∗ := ¬∀x.¬A∗.
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Proposition 11. Every classical Kripke model C = (K ,≤,D,s,⊥) gives rise to an intuitionistic Kripke model with exploding
worlds I = (K ,≤,D,i,⊥), which inherits all components of C, except for i, which is defined for atomic formulae by non-
strong forcing, i.e.,
w i X iffw : X .
The translation (·)∗ relates C and I; that is, for any worldw and any formula A we have
w i A∗ iffw : A.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A and by using (1)–(3) from Lemma 5 and (2) from Lemma 8. We detail only the
induction case for ∨, which is the most involved one:
w i (A ∨ B)∗ ⇐⇒
w i ¬(¬A∗ ∧ ¬B∗) ⇐⇒
(∀w′ ≥ w) [w′ i ¬A∗, w′ i ¬B∗ =⇒ w′ i ⊥] ⇐⇒
(∀w′ ≥ w)[ (∀w′′ ≥ w′)[w′′ i A∗ =⇒ w′′ i ⊥],
(∀w′′ ≥ w′)[w′′ i B∗ =⇒ w′′ i ⊥]
=⇒ w′ i ⊥] ⇐⇒
(∀w′ ≥ w)[ (∀w′′ ≥ w′)[w′′ : A =⇒ w′′ ⊥],
(∀w′′ ≥ w′)[w′′ : B =⇒ w′′ ⊥]
=⇒ w′ ⊥] ⇐⇒
(∀w′ ≥ w) [w′ : A , w′ : B =⇒ w′ ⊥] ⇐⇒
(∀w′ ≥ w) [w′ : A ∨ B s=⇒ w′ ⊥] ⇐⇒
w : A ∨ B 
3. LKµµ˜ and soundness
To emphasize the symmetries of classical logic, we use a sequent calculus in the style of Gentzen’s LK as the proof system.
We could have directly used LK or one of its variants with implicit structural rules, à la Kleene–Kanger. In practice, even
though the current paper does not go into the details of the computational content of proofs, we rely here on LKµµ˜, which
has a simple symmetrical variant of λ-calculus as underlying language of proofs [8,18].5
LKµµ˜ is presented in Table 1. It differs from LK in the following points.
• Sequents come with an explicitly distinguished formula on the right or on the left, or no distinguished formula at all,
resulting in three kinds of sequents: ‘‘Γ ` ∆’’, ‘‘Γ |A ` ∆’’ and ’’Γ ` A|∆’’. In particular, the distinguished formula plays
an ‘‘active’’ rôle in the rules.
• Accordingly, the axiom rule splits into two variants, (AxL) and (AxR), depending on whether the left active formula or
the right active formula is distinguished. There are also two new rules, (µ) and (µ˜), for making a formula active.6
• There are no explicit contraction rules: contractions are derivable from a cut against an axiom as follows.
– Left contraction:
(AxR)
Γ , A ` A | ∆ Γ , A | A ` ∆
(Cut)
Γ , A ` ∆ (ContrL)
– Right contraction:
Γ ` A | A,∆ (AxL)Γ | A ` A,∆
(Cut)
Γ ` A,∆ (ContrR)
• Consequently, the notion of normal proof, or cut-freeness, is slightly different from the notion of cut-freeness in LK: a
normal proof is a proof whose only cuts are of the form of a cut between an axiom and an introduction rule.7 This is the
notion that we refer to when below, very often, we say ‘‘cut-free’’ or ‘‘provable without a cut’’.
5 Note that even if not based on λ-calculus, there are calculi of proof-terms for LK too; see e.g. [32,25,34].
6 Note thatwehave to define the contexts of formulaeΓ and∆ as ordered sequences to get a non-ambiguous interpretation of LKµµ˜ as a typedλ-calculus.
7 The rules (µ) and (µ˜) are not introduction rules, because they do not introduce a formula constructor.
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Table 1
The sequent calculus LKµµ˜ .
(AxL)
Γ |A ` A,∆ (AxR)A,Γ ` A|∆
Γ , A ` ∆
(µ˜)
Γ |A ` ∆
Γ ` A,∆
(µ)
Γ ` A|∆
Γ ` A|∆ Γ |B ` ∆
(→L)
Γ |A→ B ` ∆
Γ , A ` B|∆
(→R)
Γ ` A→ B|∆
Γ |A ` ∆ Γ |B ` ∆
(∨L)
Γ |A ∨ B ` ∆
Γ ` A|∆
(∨1R)Γ ` A ∨ B|∆
Γ ` B|∆
(∨2R)Γ ` A ∨ B|∆
Γ |A ` ∆
(∧1L )Γ |A ∧ B ` ∆
Γ |B ` ∆
(∧2L )Γ |A ∧ B ` ∆
Γ ` A|∆ Γ ` B|∆
(∧R)
Γ ` A ∧ B|∆
Γ |A(x) ` ∆ x fresh
(∃L)
Γ |∃xA(x) ` ∆
Γ ` A(t)|∆
(∃R)
Γ ` ∃x.A(x)|∆
Γ |A(t) ` ∆
(∀L)
Γ |∀x.A(x) ` ∆
Γ ` A(x)|∆ x fresh
(∀R)
Γ ` ∀xA(x)|∆
(⊥L)
Γ |⊥ ` ∆
(>R)
Γ ` >|∆
Γ ` A|∆ Γ |A ` ∆
(Cut)
Γ ` ∆
The correspondence between normal proofs of LK and normal proofs of LKµµ˜ is direct. If we present LK with weakening
rules attached to the axiom rules à la Kleene’s G4 or Kanger’s LC, we obtain an LK proof from an LKµµ˜ proof by erasing the
bars serving to distinguish active formulae, and by removing the trivial inferences coming from the rules (µ) and (µ˜). In the
other way round, every introduction rule of LK can be derived in LKµµ˜ by applying the rules (µ) and (µ˜) on the premises
and a (possibly dummy) contraction (i.e., a cut against an axiom) on the conclusion of the rule. Similarly for the axiom rule
(for which there are two possible derivations) and the cut rule. For more details we refer the reader to [8].
For a constant c , let Γc(t),∆c(t), Ac(t) be obtained from Γ ,∆, A by replacing each constant c with a term t .
Lemma 12 (Weakening). Suppose Γ ⊆ Γ ′ and∆ ⊆ ∆′.
• Γ ` ∆ implies Γ ′ ` ∆′.
• Γ ` A | ∆ implies Γ ′ ` A | ∆′.
• Γ | A ` ∆ implies Γ ′ | A ` ∆′.
Moreover, no further cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side are necessary.
Lemma 13. Let c be a constant and y a variable which does not appear in Γ ,∆, A.
• Γ ` ∆ implies Γc(y) ` ∆c(y).
• Γ ` A | ∆ implies Γc(y) ` Ac(y) | ∆c(y).
• Γ | A ` ∆ implies Γc(y) | Ac(y) ` ∆c(y).
Moreover, no further cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side are necessary.
The following lemma says that a fresh constant is as good as a fresh variable and will play an important role in the proof
of cut-free completeness below.
Lemma 14 (Fresh Constants). Let c be a constant and y a variable which does not appear in Γ ,∆, A. Assume furthermore that
c does not appear in Γ ,∆.
• Γ ` A(c) | ∆ implies Γ ` A(y) | ∆.
• Γ | A(c) ` ∆ implies Γ | A(y) ` ∆.
Moreover, no further cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side are necessary.
Proof. This follows directly from the lemma just above. 
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The fact that Lemmas 12–14 need not introduce any new cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side of the implication
will be important for the proof of cut-free completeness.
We now show the soundness of LKµµ˜ with respect to the Kripke semantics. First we need some preparations.
Let (K ,≤,D,s,⊥) be a Kripke model. Associations are functions from a finite set of free variables to⋃w∈K D(w). The
letters ρ, η, . . . vary over associations. Given an association ρ and a free variable x, ρ−x denotes the function obtained from
ρ by deleting x from its domain, i.e., dom(ρ−x) = dom(ρ)\{x}. Let ρ(x 7→ d) denote the function ρ ′ such that ρ ′(y) = ρ(y)
if y 6= x and d otherwise.
Let c0 be a distinguished constant of the language. Given a formula A, let A[ρ] denote the sentence in the extended
languagewith fresh constants for each element ofD obtained fromA by replacing each free variable xwithρ(x) if x ∈ dom(ρ)
and with c0 otherwise. Γ [ρ] is the context obtained from Γ by replacing each A ∈ Γ with A[ρ].
We writew : Γ whenw forces all sentences from Γ andw : ∆ whenw refutes all sentences from∆.
The intuitivemeaning of the following theorem is that, if every formula in the assumption is forced, then not all formulae
in the conclusion can be refuted.
Theorem 15 (Soundness). Let A be a formula and Γ ,∆ contexts of formulae. In any classical Kripke model (K ,≤,D,s,⊥) the
following hold. Letw ∈ K and ρ be an association with the values from D(w).
• If Γ ` ∆,w : Γ [ρ] andw : ∆[ρ] , thenw :⊥.
• If Γ ` A|∆,w : Γ [ρ] andw : ∆[ρ] , thenw : A[ρ].
• If Γ |A ` ∆,w : Γ [ρ] andw : ∆[ρ] , thenw : A[ρ] .
Proof. One easily proves the three statements simultaneously by induction on the derivations. We demonstrate two non-
trivial cases. Supposew : Γ [ρ] andw : ∆[ρ] .
• Case (∨L): Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : A[ρ] ∨ B[ρ]. We have to show that w′ is exploding. But this follows from the
fact that w′ : A[ρ] ∨ B[ρ] s. Note just that w′ : A[ρ]  and w′ : B[ρ]  follow from the induction hypothesis using
monotonicity.
• Case (∃L): Suppose w′ ≥ w and w′ : (∃x.A)[ρ]. We have to show that w′ is exploding. For this it suffices to show that
w′ : (∃x.A(x))[ρ] s, i.e., w′′ : A[ρ(x 7→ d)])  for all w′′ ≥ w′ and d ∈ D(w′′). Note first that w′′ : Γ [ρ(x 7→ d)] and
w′′ : ∆[ρ(x 7→ d)]  by monotonicity because of the freshness of x. The claim follows by the induction hypothesis. 
4. Completeness
As usual when constructively proving the completeness of Kripke semantics for a fragment8 of intuitionistic logic
[6,19,30], we define a special purpose model, called the universal model, built from the deduction system itself. Once we
show completeness for this special model, completeness for any model follows (Corollary 19).
Definition 16. The Universal classical Kripke modelU is obtained by setting
• K to the set of pairs (Γ ,∆) of contexts of LKµµ˜;
• (Γ ,∆) ≤ (Γ ′,∆′) iff both Γ ⊆ Γ ′ and∆ ⊆ ∆′;
• (Γ ,∆) : X s iff the sequent Γ |X ` ∆ is provable without a cut in LKµµ˜;
• (Γ ,∆) :⊥ iff the sequent Γ ` ∆ is provable without a cut in LKµµ˜;
• for anyw, D(w) is the set of closed terms of LKµµ˜.
Note that the domain function D is a constant function, while in the abstract definition of model we allow for non-constant
domain functions because that allows building more counter-models in applications.
Monotonicity of strong refutation on atoms follows from Lemma 12.
Theorem 17 (Cut-Free Completeness forU). For any sentence A and contexts of sentences Γ and∆, the following hold inU:
(Γ ,∆) : A =⇒ Γ ` A|∆. (1)
(Γ ,∆) : A  =⇒ Γ |A ` ∆. (2)
Moreover, the derivations on the right-hand side of (1) and (2) are cut-free.
Proof. We proceed by simultaneously proving the two statements by induction on the complexity of A. When quantifiers
are concerned, A(t) has lower complexity than ∃x.A(x) and ∀x.A(x).
The derivation trees in this proof use meta-rules (*) and multi-step derivations (ContrL, ContrL) in addition to the
derivation rules of the calculus from Table 1 in order to make the proofs easier to read.
We also remind the reader that the notion of cut-freeness is the one of LKµµ˜, introduced in the previous section.
8 As previously remarked, there is no constructive proof for full intuitionistic predicate logic.
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Base case for atomic formulae. In the base case we have forcing and refutation on atomic sentences, which by definition
reduce to strong refutation on atomic sentences, which by definition reduces just to statements about the deductions in
LKµµ˜.
(1) Suppose
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {Γ ′|X ` ∆′ =⇒ Γ ′ ` ∆′} (∗)
where the RHS is cut-free. Then the following holds for Γ ′ = Γ and∆′ = X,∆:
(AxL)
Γ |X ` X,∆
(*)
Γ ` X,∆
(µ)
Γ ` X |∆
(2) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : X , i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : X =⇒ Γ ′ ` ∆′} . (∗)
We use (∗) to prove Γ , X ` ∆ without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows by the (µ˜)-rule. For this, we
need to show that ((Γ , X),∆) : X . Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ ((Γ , X),∆) such that there is a cut-free proof forΓ ′′ | X ` ∆′′.
Then, by (ContrL), Γ ′′ ` ∆′′, that is, (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
Base cases for> and⊥. Obvious.
Induction case for implication.
(1) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : A1 → A2, i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : A1 → A2 s =⇒ Γ ′ ` ∆′} (∗)
We use (∗) to prove Γ , A1 ` A2,∆ without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows by the (µ) and (→R
) rules.We need to show that ((Γ , A1), (A2,∆)) : A1 → A2 s, i.e., ((Γ , A1), (A2,∆)) : A1 and ((Γ , A1), (A2,∆)) : A2 .
We show the first one. The second case is similar.
Assume (Γ ′,∆′) ≥ ((Γ , A1), (∆, A2)) such that (Γ ′,∆′) : A1 s. Using the induction hypothesis we get the following
cut-free proof:
Γ ′ | A1 ` ∆′
(ContrL)
Γ ′ ` ∆′
That is, (Γ ′,∆′) is exploding.
(2) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : A1 → A2 , i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : A1 → A2 =⇒ Γ ′ ` ∆′}. (∗)
We use (∗) to prove Γ , A1 → A2 ` ∆ without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows by the (µ˜)-rule. We
need to show that ((Γ , A1 → A2),∆) : A1 → A2. Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ ((Γ , A1 → A2),∆) such that (Γ ′′,∆′′)  A1
and (Γ ′′,∆′′) : A2 . Then, using the induction hypotheses we have the following cut-free proof:
Γ ′′ ` A1 | ∆′′ Γ ′′ | A2 ` ∆′′
(→L)
Γ ′′ | A1 → A2 ` ∆′′
(ContrL)
Γ ′′ ` ∆′′
That is, (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
Induction case for ∨.
(1) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : A1 ∨ A2, i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : A1 ∨ A2 s =⇒ (Γ ′,∆′) ⊥}. (∗)
First we use (∗) to show that Γ ` A1, A2, A1 ∨ A2,∆ without introducing a cut. For this we set Γ ′ = Γ and ∆′
= A1, A2, A1 ∨ A2,∆; that is, we need to show that (Γ ′,∆′) : Ai  for i = 1, 2. Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ (Γ ′,∆′) such
that (Γ ′′,∆′′) : Ai; then, by induction hypotheses, Γ ′′ ` Ai | ∆′′. Therefore, by (ContrR), (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
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Now we can prove the claim.
Γ ` A2, A1, A1 ∨ A2,∆
(µ)
Γ ` A2|A1, A1 ∨ A2,∆
(∨2L )Γ ` A1 ∨ A2|A1, A1 ∨ A2,∆
(ContrR)
Γ ` A1, A1 ∨ A2,∆
(µ)
Γ ` A1|A1 ∨ A2,∆
(∨1L )Γ ` A1 ∨ A2|A1 ∨ A2,∆
(ContrR)
Γ ` A1 ∨ A2,∆
(µ)
Γ ` A1 ∨ A2|∆
(2) The claim follows directly from the (∨L)-rule and the induction hypothesis because (Γ ,∆) : A1 ∨ A2  implies both
(Γ ,∆) : A1  and (Γ ,∆) : A2  by Lemma 7, which does not need to introduce new cuts.
Induction case for ∧.
(1) The claim follows directly from the (∧R)-rule and the induction hypotheses because (Γ ,∆) : A1 ∧ A2 implies both
(Γ ,∆) : A1 and (Γ ,∆) : A2, by Lemma 5, which does not need to introduce new cuts.
(2) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : A1 ∧ A2 , i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : A1 ∧ A2 =⇒ (Γ ′,∆′) ⊥}. (∗)
We use (∗) to show that Γ , A1 ∧ A2 ` ∆ without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows by the (µ˜)-rule. By
Lemma 5, we need to show that ((Γ , A1 ∧ A2),∆) : Ai for i = 1, 2. Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ ((Γ , A1 ∧ A2),∆) such that
(Γ ′′,∆′′) : Ai s. Using induction hypotheses, we get the following cut-free proof:
Γ ′′ | Ai ` ∆′′
(∧iL)
Γ ′′ | A1 ∧ A2 ` ∆′′
(ContrL)
Γ ′′ ` ∆′′
Therefore, (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
Induction case for ∀.
(1) Assume (Γ ,∆) : ∀x.A(x). Then, by Lemma 5, (Γ ,∆) : A(t) for all closed terms. In particular, we have (Γ ,∆) : A(c)
for some fresh constant c which does not occur in Γ ,∆, A. Using the induction hypothesis we get a cut-free proof of
Γ ` A(c) | ∆. By Lemma 14, this implies a cut-free proof of Γ ` A(x) | ∆ for any fresh variable x, so the claim follows.
(2) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : ∀x.A(x) , i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : ∀x.A(x) =⇒ (Γ ′,∆′) ⊥}. (∗)
We use (∗) to show that Γ ,∀x.A(x) ` ∆without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows by the (µ˜)-rule; that
is, we need to show that ((Γ ,∀x.A(x)),∆) : A(t) for any closed term t . Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ ((Γ ,∀x.A(x)),∆) such
that (Γ ′′,∆′′) : A(t) s. Using the induction hypothesis we get the following cut-free proof:
Γ ′′ | A(t) ` ∆′′
(∀L)
Γ ′′ | ∀x.A(x) ` ∆′′
(ContrL)
Γ ′′ ` ∆′′
Therefore, (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
Induction case for ∃.
(1) Suppose (Γ ,∆) : ∃x.A(x), i.e.,
∀(Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆), {(Γ ′,∆′) : ∃x.A(x) s =⇒ (Γ ′,∆′) ⊥}. (∗)
We use (∗) to show that Γ ` ∃x.A(x),∆ without introducing a cut, from which the claim follows using the (µ)-rule.
We need to show that (Γ , (∆, ∃x.A(x))) : A(t)  for any closed term t .
Assume (Γ ′′,∆′′) ≥ (Γ , (∆, ∃x.A(x))) such that (Γ ′′,∆′′) : A(t). Using the induction hypothesis we get the
following cut-free proof:
Γ ′′ ` A(t) | ∆′′
(∃R)
Γ ′′ ` ∃x.A(x) | ∆′′
(ContrR)
Γ ′′ ` ∆′′
Therefore, (Γ ′′,∆′′) is exploding.
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(2) Assume (Γ ,∆) : ∃x.A(x) , then (Γ ,∆) : ∃x.A(x) s by Lemma 7. That is, (Γ ,∆) : A(t)  for all closed terms.
In particular, we have (Γ ,∆) : A(c)  for some fresh constant c which does not occur in Γ ,∆, A. Using induction
hypotheses we have a cut-free proof of Γ | A(c) ` ∆. By Lemma 14, this implies a cut-free proof of Γ | A(x) ` ∆ for
any fresh variable, so the claim follows. 
Corollary 18. For any sentence A and contexts of sentences Γ ,∆, the following hold inU:
1. If A ∈ Γ then (Γ ,∆) : A.
2. If B ∈ ∆ then (Γ ,∆) : B .
Proof. 1. Assume A ∈ Γ , (Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆) and (Γ ′,∆′) : A s. Then, by Theorem 17, Γ ′ | A ` ∆′, so we obtain a cut-free
proof for Γ ′ ` ∆′ using (ContrL). That is, (Γ ′,∆′) is exploding.
2. Assume B ∈ ∆, (Γ ′,∆′) ≥ (Γ ,∆) and (Γ ′,∆′) : B. Then, by Theorem 17, Γ ′ ` B | ∆′, so we obtain a cut-free proof
for Γ ′ ` ∆′ using (ContrR). That is, (Γ ′,∆′) is exploding. 
Corollary 19 (Completeness of Classical Logic). If in every Kripke model, at every possible world, the sentence A is forced
whenever all the sentences of Γ are forced and all the sentences of ∆ are refuted, then there exists a cut-free derivation in LKµµ˜
of the sequent Γ ` A|∆.
Proof. If the hypothesis holds for any Kripkemodel, it also holds forU. Theorem 17 and Corollary 18 lead to the claim, since
(Γ ,∆) : Γ and (Γ ,∆) : ∆ . 
Remark 20. The following are false, even if reasoning classically.
• w : A ∨ B impliesw : A orw : B.
• w : ∃x.A(x) impliesw : A(d) for some d ∈ D(w).
Because of the completeness of classical logic with respect to the universal model, the claims correspond to the Disjunction
property (DP) and Explicit definability property (ED), respectively, which are in general not true in classical logic.
A constructive cut-free completeness theorem can also be used for proof normalization.
Corollary 21 (Semantic Cut-Elimination). For all contexts Γ ,∆ of sentences, if there is a derivation of Γ ` ∆, then there is a
cut-free derivation of Γ ` ∆.
Proof. From the hypothesis Γ ` ∆, the soundness theorem applied toU gives us that there is indeed a cut-free derivation
for Γ ` ∆ because the world (Γ ,∆) forces all formulae of Γ and refutes all formulae of∆, as shown in Corollary 18. 
5. Discussion, related and future work
5.1. Normalization by evaluation
The last corollary is at the origin of our work, where we wanted to do a normalization-by-evaluation (NBE) proof for
computational classical logic. The general idea of the NBE method is to use an ‘‘evaluation’’ (soundness) function from
the object-language to a constructive meta-language and then use a ‘‘reification’’ (completeness) function from the meta-
language back to the object-language. The interpretation of the object-language inside the meta-language, that goes via
evaluation/soundness, is usually done using some form of Kripke model.
So far, NBE has been used to show the normalization of various intuitionistic proof systems [5,11,2,1,28,30] as well
as purely computational calculi [12]. One advantage of taking this approach to that of studying a reduction relation for a
proof calculus for classical logic, explicitly as a rewrite system, is that one circumvents both difficulties of rewrite systems
and validating equalities arising from η-conversion. For more details on these difficulties the reader is referred to [33], for
classical proof systems, and [13] for intuitionistic proof systems. Another advantage is that these kinds of proofs manipulate
finite structures only and avoid working with saturated models as, for example, in [31].
Note also that, although as output from the NBE algorithm we get a β-reduced η-long normal form, we proved a weak
NBE result, as we did not prove that the output can be obtained from the input by a number of rewrite steps, as is done
in [6].
5.2. Dual notion of a model
Thanks to the symmetry of the LKµµ˜ rules for left-distinguished and right-distinguished formulae, it is possible to define
a dual notion of a model in which
• ‘‘strong forcing ’’ is taken as primitive and ‘‘refutation’’ and non-strong ‘‘forcing’’ are defined from it by orthogonality like
in Definition 2,
• for the universal model, strong forcing is defined as cut-free provability of right-distinguished formulae (instead of left-
distinguished ones for strong refutation),
and prove, completely analogously to the proofs presented in this paper, thatwe have the same soundness and completeness
theorems holding.
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The reader interested in the computational behaviour of the completeness theorem should look at its partial Coq
formalization [20]. From that work it follows that the NBE theorem computes the normal forms of proofs in a call-by-name
discipline. We mention this work because we would like to conjecture that the presented classical Kripke model always
gives rise to call-by-name behaviour for proof normalization, while the dual notion gives rise to call-by-value behaviour. As
one of the referees remarked, there are a variety of different strategies for doing proof normalization, of which call-by-name
and call-by-value are the simplest ones to describe, but also the most standard ones. For a general study of cut-elimination
strategies that are more complex than call-by-name and call-by-value, the reader is referred to [10].
5.3. Using intuitionistic Kripke models on doubly negated formulae
Although one can define a double-negation interpretation A∗ of formulae and use intuitionistic Kripke models and an
intuitionistic completeness theorem to obtain a normalization result, onewould have to pass through the chain of inferences
`c A =⇒ `i A∗ =⇒ i A∗ =⇒ `nfi A∗ =⇒ `nfc A
where ‘‘i’’ stands for ‘‘intuitionistic’’, ‘‘c’’ for ‘‘classical’’ and ‘‘nf’’ for ‘‘in normal form’’, in which how to do the last inference
is not obvious. We consider that to be a detour since we can prove, simply, the chain of inferences
`c A =⇒ c A =⇒ `nfc A.
The interest in having a direct-style semantics for classical logic is the same as the interest in having a proof calculus for
classical logic instead of restricting oneself to an intuitionistic calculus and working with doubly negated formulae; or, in
the theory of programming languages, to having a separate constant call-cc instead of writing all programs in continuation-
passing style.
Avigad shows in [3] how classical cut-elimination is a special case of intuitionistic cut-elimination,workwhich resembles
the first chain of inferences of this subsection. However, his work is specialized to ‘‘negative’’ formulae; that is, it is not clear
how to extend it to formulae that use ∨ and ∃.
Finally, we remark that an interpretation through intuitionistic Kripke models and a double-negation interpretation
would have to be done in Kripke models with exploding nodes, because of the meta-mathematical results from [21,26,27].
5.4. Boolean versus Kripke semantics for classical logic
We compare Boolean and Kripke semantics in a constructive setting, based on our own observations (which we hope to
submit for publication soon) and based on a strand of works in mathematical logic from the 1960s.
Computational behaviour. The only known constructive completeness proof of classical logicwith respect to Booleanmodels
is the one of Krivine [24], who used a double-negation interpretation to translate Gödel’s original proof. Krivine’s proof was
later reworked by Berardi and Valentini [4] to show that its main ingredient is a constructive version of the ultra-filter
theorem for countable Boolean algebras. This theorem, however, crucially relies on an enumeration of the members of the
algebra (the formulae).
In the work we mentioned as yet to be put into words, a formalization in constructive type theory of the proof of
Berardi and Valentini, we saw that, as a consequence of relying on the linear order, the reduction relation for proof-terms
corresponding to implicative formulae is not β-reduction, but an ad hoc reduction relation which depends on the particular
way one defines the linear order (enumeration of formulae). As a consequence, there is no clear notion of normal form
suggested by the ad hoc reduction relation. The cut-free completeness theorem given in this paper, however, gives rise
to a normalization algorithm which respects the β-reduction relation of the object-language, when the Kripke models are
interpreted in a type theory which is based on β-reduction itself.
Expressiveness. We think of classical Kripkemodel validity as beingmore expressive, i.e., containingmore information, than
Booleanmodel validity. That is indicated by the presented completeness theorem, which is both simpler than (constructive)
completeness theorems for Booleanmodels, andmanipulates finite structures directly, instead of relying on structures built
up by an infinite saturation process.
Also, only after submitting the first version of the present text did we become aware of the work done in the 1960s on
using Kripke models to do model theory of classical logic [14]. Although conducted in a classical meta-language, the work
indicates that it is possible to use Kripke models to express elegantly some cumbersome constructions of model theory, like
set theoretic forcing [9,14]. Indeed, the connection between the two had been spotted already by Kripke [23], and hence the
term ‘‘forcing’’ appeared in Kripke semantics. We hope that looking at those kinds of construction inside Kripke models, but
this time inside a constructivemeta-language, might be an interestingway to find out the constructive content of techniques
of classical model theory.
In this respect, our work can also be seen as a contribution to the field of constructive model theory of classical logic.
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